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INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing pressure for developing countries to grow more rapidly, there is 
often a concomitant call for cuts in defense expenditures to finance new projects. 
Recently it has been suggested that defense spending may play a positive role 
rather than the usually perceived negative role in economic development. The link 
between defense and development is not clear, however. As was recently noted, 
while military spending has risen 63% between 1970 and 1979, " ... no clear 
agreement has emerged about the nature and extent of their economic impact. "1 
As we have suggested earlier, 2 it is possible for defense spending to have both 
positive and negative effects on growth. Furthermore, both effects are likely to be 
true at different points in time. On the positive side, defense spending may 
contribute to growth by: 
... (1) feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who would otherwise 
have to be fed, housed, and clothed by the civilian economy; (2) ... providing 
education and medical care as well as vocational and technical training; ... (3) 
engaging in a variety of public works; ... ( 4) engaging in scientific and technical 
specialities ... which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian personnel.3 
On the negative side, Benoit identified three types of possible effects. 4 The first 
effect, the income shift, suggests that defense spending reduces the civilian Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and decreases growth proportionately. Secondly, 
defense spending as a component of government spending may hurt growth since 
the government sector generally exhibits "negligible rates of productivity 
increases. "5 Thirdly, growth may suffer as the opportunity cost of funds is 
proportionately higher in defense. 
While these arguments make intuitive sense, we hypothesize that a crucial 
determinant left out of the argument is the country's financial resource constraint. 
A severely resource constrained country f~cing budget reductions is likely to 
sacrifice development projects to maintain defense budgets. Not only will this tend 
to reduce economic growth per se, it is also likely to lead to a simultaneous decrease 
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in private investment. The reverse is true for countries relatively resource 
unconstrained - they can easily afford growth oriented projects while maintaining 
(or even increasing) defense programs. 
In this article we briefly review some of the major contributions to the 
literature.6 Using our model based on resource constraints, we then test the 
defense and economic growth thesis using a form of the model recently suggested 
by Lim.7 This is done in two steps: (a) the countries are split into two groups and 
(b) regression equations are estimated for each group. The results generally 
confirm our predicted relationship of the positive effect that defense spending may 
play in the economies of some developing countries. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
One of the earliest works in the field was completed by Benoit.8 He estimated a 
multiple regression equation in the following form: 
CIVGDP = f (INV, AID, DEFN), 
where CIVGDP is the real growth in GDP minus real growth in defense 
expenditures,9 INV is the gross capital formulation as a percent of GDP, AID is the 
receipts of bilateral aid as a percent of GDP, and D EFN is defense expenditure as a 
percent of GDP. He concluded that "Contrary to my expectations, countries with a 
heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and those with 
the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates." 10 
In addition Benoit questioned the direction of causality between defense and 
growth. While recognizing that countries which are growing fast might "indulge 
themselves in the luxury of defense" he concluded that growth was a weak 
determinant of defense and that "the direct interaction ... seems to run primarily 
from defense burdens to growth rather than vice versa." 11 
Benoit's findings were confirmed by Kennedy. 12 Kaldor found a strong 
association between industrialization and arms expenditures based on an inter-
pretation of data provided by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 13 
Amsden, in a critical review of Kaldor's work, suggested that the analysis of the 
data did not reveal any positive association between the military burden and GDP 
growth rates. 14 McKinley and Cohen's study15 found no statistical relationship 
between military regimes and growth. Dabelko and McCormick grouped countries 
by the type of government16 and found that centrist regimes have lowered the 
opportunity costs for education and health while the opposite is true for polyarchic 
regimes. 
As an initial test of the resource constraint thesis, Frederiksen and Looney 
reestimated Benoit's equations for two subsets of the original sample of countries in 
the Benoit paper. 17 The coefficient of DEFN was positive and statistically 
significant for the relatively unconstrained group and negative and statistically 
significant for the constrained group. Benoit's methodology, especially the 
inclusion of an aid variable in the model, has recently come under criticism from 
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Ball. 18 Enlarging the sample to 90 countries and using a later time period, 
Frederiksen and Looney reexamined the resource constrained hypothesis. 19 In this 
analysis, it was found that the coefficient of the defense variable was not 
statistically significant for the entire group, was significant for the unconstrained 
group, and negative but not statistically significant for the constrained group. 
Lim has also recently questioned Benoit's results by suggesting that they were 
obtained "with the use of functional relationships that were inconsistent with the 
hypothesis to be tested and with the use of variables that were incorrectly 
measured. "20 He suggested that the correct functional relationship should be in the 
following Harrod-Damar forms: 
Yg = f (!OCR, DIY, FIS) 
Yg = f (!OCR, DIGE, FIS), 
where Yg is the growth of real GDP, /OCR is the incremental output-capital ratio, 
DIY and DIGE the defense expenditure to GDP and to total government current 
and capital expenditure ratios, respectively, and FIS the deficit on current account 
to gross national savings ratio. 
His results "show that defense spending is detrimental to economic growth in 
LDC's, a conclusion that is diametrically opposite to that reached by Benoit. "21 
Furthermore, by estimating the equations for different regions of the world, he 
concluded that: 
Our results also show marked interregional differences in the relationship between 
defense and growth. Economic growth in the African and western Hemisphere 
LDCs in the sample seemed to be adversely affected by defense spending. On the 
other hand, there is no relationship between defense and growth in the other two 
groups of LDCs (Asia and Middle East and Southern Europe). 22 
No theoretical explanation was offered by Lim as to why the hemisphere would 
make any difference in the argument as to the role of defense on growth. 
This paper assumes the Lim formulation of the model and tests this functional 
form in the context of resource constraints as outlined above. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using Lim's form, the equation to be estimated can be expressed in the following 
manner: 
GY = f (ICOR, FS, DEFN), 
where GYis the average annual growth rate of GDP between 1965 and 1973, ICOR 
is the incremental capital-output ratio averaoged between 1968 and 1973, FS is the 
average deficit to national savings ratio for 1965, 1970, and 1973, and DEFN is the 
average of 1970 and 1973 defense expenditures as a percent of GDP. 23 The sign of 
the coefficient for ICOR and FS is hypothesized to be negative. The sign of the 
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coefficient for DEFN will depend on the country's resource constraint: positive for 
the richer countries and negative for the poorer countries. 
As an initial step, the equation was estimated for the entire sample of 95 
countries to see if any overall relationship existed. The result was as follows: 24 
GY = 6.4 - 0.24/COR - 0.83FS + 0.08DEFN; R2 = 0.24 
(-2.5)*** (-4.3)** (0.8) 
The signs of the coefficients are as hypothesized and are significantly different from 
zero at the 90% level for ICOR and FS. The coefficient of DEFN is not statistically 
significant. 
Since we hypothesize that the relationship between defense and growth will 
depend on the relative financial constraints faced by countries, we separated the 
sample into groups by means of a cluster analysis. Two variables were used to 
separate: the average national savings to gross domestic investment ratios for 
1970-1977 and the average balance of payments to gross domestic investment ratio 
for 1970-1977. While any number of conceivable proxy indicators could have been 
used in the cluster analysis, the selection of these two was based largely on the 
availability of the data and the comparability of data across countries. The results 
of the analysis are shown in Table 1. 25 
Table l. Mean values, national savings and balance of payments to gross 
domestic investment, 197CH977 
National savings as Balance of payments as 
Group a % of gross domestic a % of gross domestic 
investment investment 
Group I 39.7 -61.7 
(n = 42) 
Group II 90.6 - 9.9 
(n = 49) 
Group III 313.3 213.3 
Saudi Arabia 
Group IV 732.0 632.6 
Kuwait 
Group I, the resource constrained group, is characterized by a very low savings 
rate and a high deficit ratio. This indicates a high external dependence and 
relatively little foreign exchange earnings. Groups II, III, and IV (combined in this 
analysis) exhibit exactly the opposite. By and large this grouping seems intuitively 
satisfactory. 
The within group regressions were then estimated and the results are as follows: 
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Group I: GY = 5.9 - 0.13/COR - 0.06FS - 0.06DEFN; R2 = 0.29 
(-1.0) (-2.6)*** (-0.7) 
Group II: GY = 7.6 - 0.61JCOR - O.BFS + 
(-4.2)*** (-0.6) 
0.25DEFN; R 2 = 0.48 
(2.2)** 
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The most striking result is that the coefficient for DEFN in Group II is positive and 
statistically significant at the 95% level. This result supports our original 
hypothesis. While the coefficient for DEFN in the poorer group is negative, it is not 
statistically significant at the 90% level. As suggested earlier,26 this tentative 
rejection of the relationship is likely due to increasing complexity of defense 
spending in developing countries. Over time, we suggest that there has been a shift 
in the make up of defense budget toward items of increasing sophistication and 
technological advancement. Had the same money been spent on operation::; and 
maintenance for example, growth would have been hindered to a much larger 
degree in these countries. 
The results for the other two variables are mixed. While all the signs are as 
expected, only the coefficient for FS in Group I and JCOR in Group II are 
statistically significant. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been to reexamine the defense spending and 
economic growth relationship using a functional form recently suggested by Lim. 
This test has 'been conducted within the framework of our resource constraint 
hypothesis, which suggests that richer countries will experience a positive 
relationship between defense and growth, while poorer countries will experience 
the opposite. A cluster analysis was conducted to separate countries in richer and 
poorer groups. 
Linear regressions were then estimated for each group and the estimated 
coefficient of the defense variable in the richer group was statistically significant. 
While the coefficient was negative for the poorer countries it was not statistically 
different from zero. We suggest that this result might reflect the changing 
composition of defense expenditures in some developing countries. By and large 
our results contradict earlier work that suggests that defense spending is 
detrimental to growth, or that the relationship depends on the geographical 
location of the country. A model based on resource constraints predicts that 
defense can and does play an important role in the growth process of many 
developing countries. For the remaining countries, the evidence would suggest a 
neutral role. 
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